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DEBATE:
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
THE HONORABLE ANTHONY SCIRICA, MODERATOR,*

THOMAS GoTrSCHALK** &
DAVID WEINER"
I. OPENING
THE HONORABLE ANTHONY SCIRICA: I am Tony Scirica, a
judge on the Third Circuit in Philadelphia. I will be the moderator for
this section dealing with punitive damages. There are two distinguished
participants with me today. Tom Gottschalk is the Senior Vice President
and general counsel of General Motors. A graduate of the University of
Chicago School of Law, he was a partner and member of the management
committee of Kirkland & Ellis in Washington, D.C. He has been
involved in all of the important General Motors cases over the past two
decades. David Weiner is a partner in the Cleveland law firm of Hahn,
Loeser & Parks where he is also Chairman of the firm. A graduate of
Georgetown Law Center, he clerked for Judge Prettyman in the D.C.
Circuit. He has been an active litigator nationwide and has chaired many
committees including the ABA Litigation Section. Each gentleman will
make a presentation, followed by rebuttal, and then we will open for
questions.
Before we begin, I want to give a brief overview. "Punitive damages
are a powerful weapon"' and are "ripe for reevaluation."2 These words
were written in 1991 by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in her dissenting
opinion in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.3 She said that
punitive awards had received scant attention in the past because they were
rarely assessed and were likely to be small in amount.4 They arose from
a time when compensatory damages were not available for pain and
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. He is also a member
of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Foundation.
** Senior Vice President and General Counsel, General Motors.
*** Partner, Hahn, Loeser, & Parks. He is also the past Chair of the Advisory
Group Task Force on Differentiated Case Management.
1. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
2. Id. at 61.
3. 499 U.S. 1.
4. See id. at 61 (quoting Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairnessand Efficiency in the Law
of Punitive Damages, 56 S.CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1982)).
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suffering and other forms of intangible injury.' Time has changed all of
that. In recent years we have witnessed a rise in the frequency and size
of punitive damage awards, especially with respect to products liability
and mass tort actions, and even bad faith contract actions.6 Citing the
arbitrary nature of punitive damage awards, Justice O'Connor said due
process requires the imposition of certain standards. 7
Of course, there is another point of view, an opposing view,
articulated most clearly by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinions in
Haslip,8 TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. , and most
recently in his dissent in BMW of North America, Inc., v. Gore.'"
Calling the Court's decision in BMW an "unjustified incursion into the
province of state governments,"" Justice Scalia said that a state law that
commits the decision whether to impose punitive damages to the jury,
subject to some judicial review for reasonableness, provides a defendant
with all the process that is due.' 2 In other words, a defendant is entitled
to procedural due process protections, including an opportunity to contest
the reasonableness of a damage award in state court. 3 But the
Fourteenth Amendment, said Justice Scalia, is not a "repository of
substantive guarantees against 'unfairness' . . . [and] there is no federal
guarantee a damages award actually be reasonable."' 4 Justice Scalia had
another concern about the majority's decision in BMW. He said the Court
did not provide any real guidance as to what was constitutionally
proper. 5 Acknowledging that there were difficulties with some punitive
damage awards, Justice Scalia said it was up to the state legislatures,
Congress, or the state supreme courts to rectify any problems. 6
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See id.
See id. at 62.
See id. at 62-64.
See d. at 24-39.
509 U.S. 443, 470-72 (1993).
116 S. Ct. 1589, 1610-14 (1996).
Id. at 1610.

12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id.at 1612.

16. See id. at 1610-12 ("One might understand the Court's eagerness to enter this
field, rather than leave it with the state legislatures, if it had something useful to say.
In fact, however, its opinion provides virtually no guidance to legislatures, and to state
and federal courts, as to what a 'constitutionally proper' level of punitive damages might
be.").
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We have heard a lot about BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore in
the last two days. It was a five to four decision. But what did the
Supreme Court say? Well, they said that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a 'grossly
excessive' punishment on a tortfeasor."' 7 When the award becomes
grossly excessive, it enters a "zone of arbitrariness. " "
If you recall, the facts in the case are as follows: Dr. Gore had
purchased a BMW for over forty thousand dollars. 9 Sometime en route
The repairs and
to Alabama, it had suffered some paint damage.'
2 ' There was testimony at trial
dollars.
hundred
six
repainting cost about
that because of the repairs the car's value was reduced by four thousand
The jury awarded four thousand dollars in compensatory
dollars.'
damages and four million dollars in punitive damages, which was later
reduced to two million dollars by the Alabama Supreme Court.'
The Alabama jury decided that BMW's failure to disclose that the car
had been repainted was a suppression of a material fact that constituted
fraud.24 BMW had followed a policy of not disclosing repairs to new
cars when the cost amounted to less than three percent of the car's
suggested retail price. This nondisclosure policy was consistent with the
laws of twenty-five states defining disclosure obligations for auto dealers,
indicative of the patchwork of rules representing diverse policy judgments
in the fifty states.'
Because a justification for the award was to induce BMW to change
its nationwide policy with respect to the disclosure of minor repairs, the
Court, citing principles of state sovereignty and comity, said that a state
may not impose economic sanctions on its tortfeasors with the intent to
change lawful conduct of tortfeasors in other states. 26 And then, citing
elementary notions of fairness requiring adequate notice of the possible
severity of penalties, the Court set forth three guideposts to evaluate
17. Id. at 1592 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443, 454 (1993)).
18. Id. at 1595.
19. See id. at 1593.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1593-95.
24. See id. at 1594.
25. See id. at 1593-94.
26. See id. at 1597.
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whether or not the award was constitutional. 27 The first was the
conduct's degree of reprehensibility. 28 The second was the ratio or
disparity between harm, actual or potential, and the punitive award,
typically measured by considering the ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages.2 9 And the third was sanctions for comparable
misconduct.3" The Court made clear that the most important factor is the
conduct's degree of reprehensibility. 3' Trickery and deceit, it said, are
more reprehensible than negligence, and repeated conduct is more
32
significant than just one or two isolated instances.
When it looked at the BMW case, the Court said that none of the
aggravating factors normally associated with reprehensible conduct were
present.3 Here there was purely economic harm, no reckless disregard
for public health or safety, and no bad faithY34 There probably was not
even a material misrepresentation.35 Moreover, BMW may have been
justified in relying on a safe harbor concept because many states had
adopted laws condoning BMW's conduct.3 6
The Court then distinguished two recent cases, Haslip, decided in
1991, and TXO, decided in 1993. Haslip, the court said, was different
because the tortfeasor made deliberate false statements.37 TXO, which
involved a ratio of harm to punitive damages similar to BMW, differed
because the case involved acts of affirmative misconduct, concealment of
evidence, and improper motive.38 With respect to the reasonable
relationship between compensatory and punitive damages, you may recall
that in Haslip, the ratio was four to one, 39 but in TXO it was much
higher.' In BMW, the ratio was five hundred to one. 4' And, in a nice
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

1598-99.
1598-1601.
1601-03.
1603-04.
1599.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at
See id. at
See id.
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id.

1599-1600.
1599.
1600-01.
1600.
1601.

39. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991).
40. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459, 462.

Alliance Resources Corp. obtained a judgement against TXO for $19,000 in actual

damages and $10 million in punitive damages, a punitive/actual ratio of 526 to 1. See
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turn of phrase, the Court said "[W]hen the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to
1 . . . the award must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow.' '42
When the Court looked at sanctions for comparable misconduct, it found
that many states had rather minor penalties for these kind of transgressions
and that Alabama provided a maximum penalty of two thousand dollars
under its Deceptive Trade Practices Act.43 At the close of the opinion,
after reiterating the federal interest in preventing each state from imposing
undue burdens on interstate commerce, the Court said it would not apply
a bright line rule.' Courts must examine these cases individually.
Interestingly, there was a concurring opinion by Justice Stephen
45
Breyer joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and David Souter.
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion candidly acknowledged that the facts
and procedures in BMW were not very different from Haslip and TXO
and, in those cases, the Court said that the procedures were acceptable,
as a constitutional matter. 46 And they reiterated the principle that if fair
procedures were followed, punitive damage awards carry a strong
presumption of validity.47 But the concurring Justices believed the
presumption was overcome in the BMW case for two reasons. First,
Alabama's standards did not impair the jury's and the court's discretion,
They admitted that
and second, the award was grossly excessive.'
finding severe disproportionality between the amount of the award and
legitimate punitive objectives implicates judgment about matters of degree,
but said in this case it is easy to find that the award crossed the line.49
id. at 462. The Court did not find that disparity between actual and punitive damages
impermissible because it took into account the actual potential damages, that is, the
probable actual damages to Alliance Resources had TXO succeeded in its "illicit
scheme." See id. "[E]ven if the actual value of the 'potential harm' to respondents is
not between $5 million and $8.3 million, but is closer to $4 million, or $2 million, or
even $1 million, the disparity between the punitive award and the potential harm does
not, in our view, 'jar one's constitutional sensibilities.'" Id. (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S.

at 18).
41.
42.
43.
44.

See BMW of N. Am., Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1602.
Id. at 1603 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 482 (O'Connor, ., dissenting)).
See id. (referring to ALA. CODE § 8-19-11(b) (1993)).
See id. at 1604.

45. See id.
46. See id. ("[T]he Court ... has found that punitive damages procedures very
similar to those followed here were not, by themselves, fundamentally unfair."); TXO,
509 U.S. at 462-66; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15-24.
47. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1604 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 457).
48. See id. at 1609.

49. See id.
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Where does all of this leave us? Well, it appears that BMW has
breached the wall that previously insulated punitive damages from
constitutional review, but it may not have breached it by much. When
you examine Haslip, TXO, and BMW, they seem to say that if the ratio of
punitive damages to actual damages is extremely high, regardless of
whether there is bad motive, if public health or safety issues are involved,
or if there is any deceitful contuct, then a punitive award may still face a
constitutional challenge. Absent that, the award may stand.
Of course, there are many legislative solutions to the issues raised
here, both in the state legislatures and in Congress, some of which have
already have been adopted. I'm sure our panel will speak about some of
these proposals. At this point, I will call on Tom Gottschalk.
II.

MAIN ARGUMENTS

THOMAS GOTTSCHALK: Rather than get into a discussion of the
Supreme Court decisions or some of the fine tuning that has been
attempted through legislative compromise about punitive damages, I would
like to approach the topic from a policy perspective. Last Friday, I
attended a conference in Detroit that decried the decline in values and
ethical standards that afflicts the legal profession and erodes public
confidence in the American legal system. Justice Boyle of the Michigan
Supreme Court observed at one point in that conference that she wished
that lawyers as advocates before her, in the interest of candor and justice,
could figure out how to more dispassionately and objectively identify the
weaknesses in their own arguments while they so vigorously attack their
opponents' arguments. We recognize the difficulty in our adversary
system of doing that, but I thought that I would propose to my colleague,
David, that we try a more civil, less adversarial approach on this panel.
And so, I will not approach the topic with my usual passion, vitriol, and
hyperbole-although, Judge, as soon as BMW is mentioned, I begin to feel
the blood surge a little bit.
If anybody wonders about the effect of punitive damages on
settlements, right after I came to GM, and the BMW case had been
decided, I was made aware that Gore's lawyer had found plaintiffs to sue
every auto manufacturer on similar theories. However, I could not
determine for what reason they would sue GM, because we do not import
our cars and repaint them if they are scratched up in shipping. The
plaintiff's theory was based on GM's quality control: if in our quality
inspection at a plant, we detected that there was any substandard paint
aspect on that car, we would put it through a repaint facility at the very
assembly plant where it was put together before we sold it and before it
was released to the customer. Essentially, we were being sued for
punitive damages for a "flagrant disregard" of consumer rights: not
disclosing the fact that our quality standards had spotted something on a
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car before it was released for sale, and we had made it right. And, did
we pay more in settlement of those cases than we might have because of
the state of law in Alabama as then defined in BMW and the threat of
punitive damages? Without disclosing the amount, you bet we did. This
is a good example of why punitive damages need stronger judicial and
legislative constraints.
I would like to turn back to sweetness and reason, so perhaps, David,
you and I can reach consensus by the end of this. How can this be done?
Maybe, the best approach is a clean slate approach. Let us assume David
Weiner is a legislator and he is coming to our state legislature or our
Congress to propose that we enact a punitive damages bill. We have to
sit down and consider whether the bill is good from a public policy
standpoint. The "Weiner Bill," as I understand it, allows the award of
punitive damages, particularly in tort cases, according to criteria not
defined in the Bill, but rather to be developed largely through case law.
As we sit down in committee and debate the merits of the Weiner Bill for
punitive damages, I think we should start by looking at the context in
which we are considering this proposal (again, we are assuming that we
do not already have punitive damages).
Our committee has to acknowledge that the public interest in health
and safety is currently protected by three major forces in society. First,
and foremost, is the marketplace. Does anyone in this room think, for
example, that if consumers thought that Johnson & Johnson consciously,
or even recklessly, contaminated its Tylenol with poison that we would
still be buying any Johnson & Johnson products today, or that their
executives would be walking the streets free?5'
We see conduct by
Johnson & Johnson and other companies that is a very moral and socially
responsible reaction to legitimate public concern about the safety of their
products. This is fairly strong evidence that business is motivated to adopt
pro-consumer ethical behavior simply as a matter of good business, to
generate customer enthusiasm and commercial success. Businesses that
disregard those interests would not be in business very long.
Second, as part of the context in which we consider the Weiner Bill,
we should recognize that we are a regulated society, especially in the areas
of consumer product safety and the environment. Such regulations come
to us through the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Food
50. See Daniel F. Cuff, Looking for Good Deeds, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1992, at
F12 (quoting James E. Burke, the chairman and chief executive of Johnson & Johnson,
who said, in the aftermath of two crises involving Tylenol adulterated with lethal
cyanide, that "[tihe company over 100 years had developed a trusting relationship with
the public. Trust is basically what all good trademarks are about."); Sandra Salmans,
Tamper-Proof Packaging, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 1982, at D6 (reporting industry
response to the September 1982 Tylenol poison scare).
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and Drug Administration (FDA), the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and on and on. And do not forget the fifty state attorneys general and all
of the agencies at the state and local levels that also look out for and
protect the public interest. Certainly, criminal sanctions, civil penalties,
product recalls, restitution, and many other remedies abound to make sure
that society punishes wrongdoers, even merely negligent tortfeasors, and
insures that they do not profit from their carelessness, much less from any
intentional infliction of harm.
The third mechanism of our society serves the purely private interest
in health and safety: our litigation system. Unlike Merry Olde England,
the access to our judiciary by any actually or allegedly injured party is
essentially unfettered.5" Indeed, we have class actions that permit the
aggregation of claims by all similarly situated plaintiffs, so they can
consolidate their resources and their leverage in a mass lawsuit.
Individual redress for noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering,
as well as for economic losses, is a cheap commodity in our society,
especially in the contingent fee world of product liability. It costs nothing
to try and fail.
We have a very competitive marketplace where the media quickly
spreads the word, true or false, of any potential threat to consumer health
or safety. It is also a highly regulated marketplace where the government
actively seeks not only to protect but to define the public interest. It is a
marketplace with a litigation system in which no injured party is prevented
from making a toll-free "800" call to obtain a free consultation to try and
secure effective representation from a lawyer who will work for the
promise of splitting the proceeds almost fifty-fifty. In this setting, what
value will the Weiner Bill add to society by setting up a system of punitive
damages?
Well, let us look at the system that you are proposing in the Weiner
Bill. Your system allows the lawyer for the injured party to include a
claim for punitive damages whenever he or she thinks there is any chance
of persuading a jury that the defendant's conduct should not go
unpunished. Your Bill does not limit the amount of punitive damages that
the lawyer may argue for. It simply creates a further economic incentive
for the lawyer to advance arguments about the defendant's misconduct by
allowing the lawyer to retain one third or more of the punitive damage
award.
51. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in
England and the United States, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 643, 664 (1986) (noting the

"more litigious nature of the American people and ... the deterrent function served by
the English rule on costs and attorney's fees").
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This Bill also allows the lawyer a broad choice of venue-freedom to
pick the localities in which local predispositions, if not outright prejudices,
tilt the scales of justice strongly in the plaintiff's favor. It permits the
lawyers to strike individuals from the jury who have the skills and
temperament to base their decisions solely on the evidence they hear in
court. It encourages plaintiffs' lawyers to turn every trial into a morality
play in which defense counsel are made to appear as co-conspirators if
they try, with the professional zeal expected of them, to present an
effective defense.
The Bill allows the jury to consider such things as the defendant's net
worth when deciding what amount to award. It asks the jury to consider
whether the defendant had "confessed" to wrongdoing by conducting a
product recall, or if no recall occurred, to sit in judgment of the
defendant's "callousness"-clearly substituting the judgment of a sixperson jury in some locality as to whether the product was safe or not for
the judgment of the NHTSA, the FDA, or the EPA. As the topper, the
Bill requires the defendant to defend its conduct time and time again, since
every individual plaintiff is allowed at least one grab at the brass ring.
Even if one jury awarded punitive damages, the Weiner Bill subjects the
same defendant to the risk of additional awards in other cases.
That is David's proposal. It sounds awfully good for the plaintiffs'
bar and maybe for their clients, but, apart from that, is anybody else
benefitting? Are there some down-sides? Well, clearly, there are some
major negatives. We are learning in science and engineering that few, if
any, blessings are entirely unmixed; there are tradeoffs. Medications
beneficial to millions may be harmful to a few, a danger which testing
may not uncover, especially if the harm is associated with excessive
dosages or is the by-product of interactions with other drugs or alcohol.
Airbags in my industry are a classic tradeoff. They save about fifteen
hundred lives a year, but we may lose two or three small children a year
because of the way the airbags must be installed in cars.52 Now, you
may argue that it is morally superior to save a few innocent childrens'
lives at the cost of 1500 adults too irresponsible to wear their seat belts.
I may happen to agree with you, but surely the federally mandated
installation of airbags by an automobile manufacturer is not a tort, much
less the type of misconduct that punitive damages are intended to reach.
We are being sued in "no airbag" cases for punitive damages and in
"airbag deployment" cases for punitive damages.
52. See Agency Seeks Change to Protect Children from Air Bags in Cars, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1996, at AlO (reporting that air bags have been blamed for the deaths
of 22 children); Robyn Meredith, Hundreds Call Government PhoneLine to Ask About
Air Bags, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996, at 27 (stating that air bags have saved about 1600
lives).
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There is no question that when tradeoffs are inevitable, which is much
of the time, punitive damages inhibit and may totally discourage the
introduction of innovations beneficial to the vast majority of the
population, or cause the removal of those innovations which have a
residuum of new or altered risk. If punitive damages are not the
equivalent of capital punishment, they are, as the Judge said in his
introduction, a "weapon." The metaphor of a terrorist bomb may be
more apt. But perhaps, if punitive damages deter desirable conduct at the
margin, would they not also deter some vestigial misconduct that would
otherwise escape the controls of the marketplace, government, or the tort
system?
Well, let us look at the free markets of Europe and Canada and the
four or five states that do not have punitive damages. 3 Europe, where
they do not have punitive damages, 4 is a good place to start. Do we
think the products made in Europe are any less safe than those made in the
U.S.? I don't think so. Somehow or other, Europe's system functions
just fine to protect health and safety-without the concept of punitive
damages. In Canada, we now have about one hundred product liability
lawsuits, two of which make claims for exemplary, or punitive, damages.
They have never been awarded. 5 One of those suits has been dismissed.
Fifty percent of the cases filed against GM in the United States-about one
thousand to fifteen hundred cases a year just in products-contain a claim
for punitive damages.
There are other negatives. Settlement costs are driven up by the
threat of punitive damages awarded by juries sitting in these pro-plaintiff
venues.56 If you do get hit with a large award, as GM did recently in
Alabama, that has a ripple effect and ramifications in other jurisdictions.
So there are some real negatives. I ask then, whether the Weiner
Bill-since it is not really going to deter any misconduct that is not already
being deterred, as we see in Europe and Canada, and it does have these
negatives-is ill advised.
53. Five states do not permit punitive damages to be awarded: New Hampshire, by
statute, and Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington, by common law. See
Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 10 n.31 (1992).
54. See generally Ernst C. Stiefel, Resolution of InternationalProducts Liability
Disputes: An Emerging ProceduralFramework, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 267, 273-74
(1990) (discussing the unavailability of punitive damages in Europe).
55. See Bruce Feldthusen, Punitive Damages in Canada: Can the Coffee Ever Be
Too Hot?, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 793, 793 (1995) (noting that "[p]unitive

damages remain rare in any type of Canadian tort case").
56. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L.
REv. 1093, 1138 (1996).
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Indeed, is the Bill even constitutional? The Judge has outlined all of
the recent Supreme Court decisions.'
While substantive due process
may not be available as an argument, at least under the current Court's
interpretation of the United States Constitution, certainly the Commerce
Clause and considerations of Federalism should make us pause before we
enact the Weiner Bill. Juries in one jurisdiction should not, as a matter
of due process, the Commerce Clause or Federalism, be allowed to
declare that the sale of certain products constitutes a flagrant disregard for
safety, where other jurisdictions and federal agencies regard these same
products as safe. Nor, under the Commerce Clause, should one state be
able to regulate products shipped throughout the fifty states by punishing
conduct outside its borders as "reckless," when other jurisdictions regard
the same conduct as reasonable and benign.
In short, punitive damages are an anachronism. They harm our
society; they produce no meaningful deterrence; and they bring to the
legal system, not to mention the legal profession, even greater disrespect
from a public aghast at the cost and randomness of these awards." The
costs of punitive damages are borne by all members of the public, whether
in the form of higher costs or the unavailability of new products. 9
You like David's bill only if you are a plaintiff's lawyer or a potential
plaintiff. Do we really favor a system where a jury of six people can sit
in judgment of technological issues and related business conduct wrenched
out of context at the urging of a plaintiff's lawyer whose perspective
extends no further than his clients' and his own pocketbook? Do we favor
a system where the jury's determination often defies or is contrary to the
far more scientific judgments of federal regulators?
Now, notwithstanding my objective analysis of your Bill, David, I
understand that it has gone to the floor of the legislature, and indeed, the
votes are in. Not surprisingly, the legislature, populated mostly by
members of the American Trial Lawyers Association, has passed
it-leaving us in the fix we are in today. Too bad.
JUDGE SCIRICA: We will ask Dave Weiner to respond.
DAVID WEINER: Thank you, your Honor. I am delighted to be
here. Tom, I am glad you do not get excited about this, God forbid. If
you really took a partisan stand, we would be in trouble.
57. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,

499 U.S. 1 (1991).
58. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956,
104th Cong. § 2(a) (1996).
59. See id.
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In a perfect world, I guess there would be no need for punitive
damages. The same could be said for criminal laws and civil laws and I
guess if that happened, God forbid, there would be no need for any of us
lawyers. But I don't think we have to worry. It is not a perfect world.
Some people, some companies, do break laws. Probably GM is not in
that category. Some people commit torts, and some people engage in
truly egregious conduct. Over the two hundred plus years of our country's
history, juries have been the conscience of our community, and they have
been able to vent their outrage when truly egregious conduct does take
place.
We have lived with punitive damages for all these years. Yes, they
are on the rise. I will talk about how much they are on the rise in a
minute. We are probably going to live with them in the future. I think
what we need to do is to act like the good lawyers that we all are, that is
identify the facts and figures, get those in mind, reason together, figure
out what is wrong, and then try to figure out a better way to do it.
The better way to do it would not be the Weiner Bill. That is not
what I am espousing. However let us take a quick look at the facts and
figures-and I will try to do this rapidly. I thank Professor Rustad, who
wrote an Iowa Law Review article on some of this a few years ago.1°
If you want all the details, look them up.
First of all, there is a myth that the amount of punitive damages is
really skyrocketing. There is a twenty-year study that shows that there
were only 355 product cases between 1965 and 1990; ninety-five of those
were asbestos-related. 6 Between 1963 and 1993, there were only 270
medical malpractice cases,62 almost half of which were reduced or
reversed on appeal.6" The average jury award was only $625 ,00 0 , 4
falling to $135,000 on appeal. 65
Obviously, this is a drop in the bucket of all of the civil litigation
damages awarded in this country. Most of the cases involving punitive
60. See Rustad, supra note 53.
61. See id. at 35-36.
62. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, ReconceptualizingPunitive Damagesin
Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters," 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 975, 1005 (1995).

63. See id. at 1012-13 (reporting that 42% of the verdicts reviewed were either
reversed, remitted or reduced).
64. See MICHAEL RUSTAD, ROSCOE POUND FOUND., DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF
TRIAL VERDICTS 29 (1991).

65. See id. at 32.
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damages are actually business contract and intentional tort cases.' One
Rand study shows that eighty percent of all punitive damage cases are in
those two categories, that is business contract and intentional tort cases. 67
But the cases the public hears about-and this is why there is such an
uproar-is the McDonald's coffee spill case,6" the BMW case,69 the
Exxon Valdez case, 0 and now, I guess the K-Mart potato chip case. 1'
That's the case of the week and I assume you saw it.
The public also heard a great deal about the asbestos-related cases and
the reorganizations that followed. However some people believe there are
campaigns to bring these cases into the public eye. My guess is, if there
were really that many punitive damage cases, then the big
ones-McDonald's, Exxon, et cetera-would not be news. No one would
talk about it. When is the last time you heard anyone talk about a three
million dollar lottery award winner? You do not hear about it anymore
because it's not news anymore. These big, big punitive damage awards
are out of the mainstream, they do not happen all the time, and their
incidence is not skyrocketing.
The next myth: Punitive damages are awarded in extremely high
figures that "boggle the mind." That is a phrase that you see time and
time again.' Well, if you use the mean, the average does get blown out,
and it does look like punitive damage awards are excessive.73 But if you
use the median amount, it shows that the awards are really quite
modest.74 If you adjust for inflation, and you take into account factors
66. See ERIK MOLLER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY
VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at 34 (1996).

67. See id. (noting that "47% were in business cases, and 36% were in intentional
tort cases").
68. See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995
WL 360309 (D. N.M. Aug. 18, 1994) (awarding the plaintiff $160,000 in compensatory
damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages).
69. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996) (finding a
two million dollar punitive damage award "grossly excessive").
70. See In re ExxonValdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1995 WL 527988, at *4 (D. Alaska
Jan. 27, 1995) (affirming a jury's punitive damage award of five billion dollars for "the
largest oil spill and greatest environmental disaster in American history").
71. See Georgescu v. K Mart Corp., 813 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. 1991) (affirming a jury
award of $420,000 for plaintiff's miscarriage, permanent sterility, and other injuries that
resulted from a slip on a potato chip in a K-Mart store).
72. See, e.g., James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages:A Relic
that Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1154 (1984).

73. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages,
75 MINN. L. REv. 1, 39-43 (1990).
74. See id.
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like growth in real income and life expectancy, you find that there has
been no great increase in punitive awards.7'
Third myth: Out-of-court juries award punitive damages that are many
times higher than actual damages. I think most of us probably would
know that. If you look at the empirical data on this, you find that the
ratio of punitive damages to actual damages is really on average fairly
close.7 6 The ratio is 1.67 to 1,' which is by no means out of whack.
Yes, there are some awards that are unusual, such as the BMW award, but
the Supreme Court slapped that one down.7" For the most part, punitive
damages are close to the amount of compensatory damages. There is a
recent study, done for Chicago Tort Reform Conference that shows in
many cases, over a long period of time, a very close correlation between
actual damages and punitive damages.79
Fourth myth: Judges are not controlling the runaway punitive damage
awards. All state punitive damage awards for the duration of the study
were upheld in less than twenty-five percent of the cases.'
Between
1965 and 1990, not including the asbestos cases, four out of ten cases
settled, one-fourth were affirmed, and one-third were reversed or
remanded."' This trend is echoed in the federal courts. There are very
few punitive damage awards in federal court." A great majority of
punitive awards in the federal courts are reversed somewhere along the
line.' Judges have the tools to control punitive damages, and the steps
are taken in the vast majority of the cases.
Fifth myth: Plaintiffs are becoming instant millionaires by entering socalled "punitive damage lotteries." That is not the case. The McDonald's
coffee spill plaintiff did not get a million dollars, the initial award was
substantially reduced by the trial judge, and the case ultimately settled for
75. See id.
76. See Galanter, supra note 56, at 1139.
77. See RUSTAD, supra note 64, at 29 (noting that even in the "top quartile of
punitive damage awards.., where the most variation occurred between compensatory
damages and punitive damages ... the variation was a mere 2:1").
78. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1603-04 (1996).
79. See Galanter, supra note 56, at 1139.
80. See RUSTAD, supra note 64, at 31.
81. See id. at 27 (noting that 36% settled, 25% were reversed or remitted, and 22%
were affirmed in whole on appeal).
82. See id. at 25 (noting that 74% of punitive damage verdicts were decided in state
trial courts).

83. See id. at 27.
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far less than that. 8 What is BMW's ultimate outcome? Who knows
what will happen. It is the media that brings these huge awards to our
attention, but when awards are reduced on appeal, or when cases are
settled later on, there is very little media attention. The big awards are
what make the news. The facts show, and this is supported by a General
Accounting Office study, that there is no trend that punitive damage
awards are increasing by any huge amount over any period of time. 8
There are only the very isolated cases you heard about this morning.
Myth six: Punitive damage awards in product cases are not the result
of serious injury, but rather, the result of a litigious society. In almost all
cases in which punitive damages are awarded, the plaintiff has been
seriously harmed. 8 There is a close correlation between a catastrophic
injury and the amount of punitive damages.' Punitive awards are not
just a result of a sue-happy population.
Myth seven: Corporations are victimized by blameworthy plaintiffs.
The opposite is true; the plaintiffs are victimized by blameworthy
corporations. When the corporations are hit with punitive damages, in
almost all of the cases-with some exceptions, which I will talk
about-you do not find negligent conduct, you find egregious conduct.
You find five general types of corporate conduct giving rise to punitive
damage awards: (1) fraudulent conduct, such as hiding data or not
disclosing it to the public; (2) knowing and undisclosed violations of safety
standards-a lot of drug cases in that area; (3) inadequate testing and
quality control during manufacturing-rush to the market, get a product
out without really doing the testing; (4) failure to warn of knowledge; and
(5) post-marketing failures to remedy known defects and damages.'
People find out later on that a lot of things that are put on the market are
not what they thought. Corporations do not redesign, do not recall, and
do not reduce the risk of known harm.
The overriding theme in product cases with large punitive awards is
the corporate defendant's failure to take available safety steps once the
harm is known. In the asbestos cases, manufacturers knew about the
health risks in the 1930s and the 1940s, yet did not take it off the market
84. See Robert A. Clifford, Justice System CorrectsIts Outrages, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
29, 1994, at 24.
85. See Study Says PunitiveDamagesAren'tExcessive, NAT'L L.J., Nov.27, 1989,
at 5.
86. See RUSTAD, supra note 64, at 34.
87. See id. at 30.
88. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1309 n. 191
(1995) (citing ToM RILEY, PROVING PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE COMPLETE HANDBOOK
24 (1981)).
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and did not warn people; rather they continued to sell asbestos. So sure
they got hit with punitive damage awards. I would think everybody would
want that to happen. Maybe not everybody.
Most punitive damage awards are as likely to be in individual-versusindividual cases as they are in individual-versus-corporation cases.
Recently the Roscoe Pound study found that the overwhelming majority
of American manufacturing corporations have had no punitive damage
awards against them in the last twenty-five years. 9
Eighth myth: Government sufficiently protects consumers by
punishing corporate misconduct. I think the facts are clear: government
is both a slow starter and a slow finisher when reacting to corporate
conduct. The government does not have the resources to do it. Often, the
government only gets involved after there have been a lot of court cases.
Most of the conduct deserving of punitive damages is not subject to
criminal fines. Moreover, if there are criminal fines, they are generally
too small to get the government's attention, or to spur corporations to
make the changes. However, some would argue that agencies and
corporations are too cozy. I think the more reasoned view is that
government just does not have the resources to police all corporate
conduct.
Ninth and last myth: Punitive damages are a self-inflicted wound on
U.S. competitiveness. No empirical evidence shows that there is a
correlation between punitive damage awards and the competitiveness of
United States businesses. United States business is not in decline-you
don't have to look any further than the Wall Street Journal or the
marketplace for evidence. Money is pouring into American businesses at
a faster rate than ever before, and our exports are up. American business
is doing very well. Further, all foreign manufacturers are subject to the
same punitive damage laws as United States manufacturers.
Manufacturers of foreign cars sold in this country-the Subarus, the
ATVs-all have been hit with punitive damages in appropriate cases.
They get the same level playing field as American corporations. Would
we sell more without punitive damages? There is no evidence that we
would. In the long run, I think limiting punitive damages would not
improve competitiveness. What improves competitiveness is improving
products.
All right, I just wanted to try to get those facts out of the way. Do
we get benefits out of punitive damages? I think everybody would say
they do. Have products changed because of punitive damage awards?
Clearly they have. Do they get the attention of the defendants and do they
get the attention of potential defendants? Yes, they do. The Consumer
Federation of America estimates that approximately six thousand deaths
89. See RUSTAD, supra note 64, at 23.
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and millions of injuries are prevented yearly because of previous
awards. 9 That does not even take into consideration how much money
is saved because of previous awards. 1
Would a cap on punitive damages help? Well, if you lower the
amount of the deterrent, would punitive damages still be the effective tool
they are to change products? I doubt it. Then manufacturers could then
simply accurately calculate how costly a risk would be and might decide,
"Well, we'll run that risk of a punitive award because it is a small
financial risk, so let's put a product of questionable safety on the market."
If we changed punitive damages, or eliminated them, what would we
have? We would have more government regulation. Tom mentioned
some of the government regulation we already have. To eliminate
punitive damages, yet sustain their level of "regulatory" effectiveness, we
would need five, six, seven times the amount of government regulation we
now have. We were founded on a free market system and punitive
damages are part of that system. They do help get safer products to the
market and they deter future bad conduct, and they are part of the world
that we live in.
Let me just run off a few quick examples of the positive effects of
punitive damages. We have warnings on Tylenol about alcohol interaction
and faulty surgical ventilators that have been removed from the market.
We have punitive damages asserting their "regulatory" effect upon poor
transmissions that jump into reverse gear, and on asbestos, crib
headboards, Playtex tampons, football helmets, highly flammable PJs, and
Ford Pintos. All of those products have been removed from the market,
changed, or drastically made better, because of punitive damage awards.
No doubt, we are a safer country because of those changes in the products
that have been subject to the legislature. We have reform.
On the federal front, both the House and the Senate passed bills in
1995 that would cap punitive damages.' The House would have caps
on all civil cases, the Senate only on product cases.93 The conference
report came out only for product cases.' The president vetoed it.95
90. See Robert V. Costello, President'sMessage, MAss. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 9,
1995, at S1.
91. See Mark N. Cooper & Gene Kimmelman, PunishmentsMust Fit the 'Crime':
Court Verdicts Are Fair, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1995, at F2.
92. See Otto G. Obermaier & Lee Dranikoff, CongressionalLegislation Seeks
Litigation Reform, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at S1.

93. See id.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 104-481, at § 102 (1996).
95. See 142 CONG. REc. H4425 (May 6, 1996) (veto message from President
Clinton).
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Is it the right way to go? I do not know. The states are all looking
at it and look to Justice Ginsburg's dissent in BMW.96 You can look at
all of the state reform efforts that are going on. Some are considering
caps. Colorado has a cap that is equal to the same as actual damagesY
Kansas's cap is the lesser of defendant's annual gross income or five
million dollars. 98 They are also looking to allocating punitives to state
agencies,' and bifurcation of trials in Ohio. We, therefore, have judges
making decisions on the amount of punitive damages.I"°
A good way to address the issue is not through the Weiner Bill, but
through a really good bill that is already out there, the Uniform Model
Punitive Damage Act.' ' After many years of spending time on this, the
Uniform Commissioners just adopted the bill this summer in their second
meeting on this subject. It is a very sensible bill that the states should
consider. The bill is well balanced: it has good things for the plaintiff,
and good things for the defendant. It has discovery only after a prima
facie case"° and only on clear and convincing standards. 0 3 It has
The punitive
tough and specific standards for vicarious liability."°
award has got to be fair and reasonable and must take into consideration
remedial measures."°c The reasonable requirements go on and on.
96. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1617-18 (1996)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting three current methods of punitive damages reform
employed by state legislatures: capping punitive damages awards; allocating a portion of
punitive damages awards to state agencies; and mandating bifurcated trials of suits for

punitive damages, with one proceeding determining liability, and the other, amount).
97. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (limiting punitive damages awards
to the amount of actual damages, except in special circumstances, when the court may
increase the punitive damages award to an amount which shall not exceed three times the

amount of actual damages).
STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e) (1994).
99. Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, New York, Oregon, and Utah require

98. See KAN.

plaintiffs to share part of any punitive damages collected with the state or a designee of
the state. See Rustad, supra note 53, at 10 n.31.
100. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(C)(2) (Anderson 1995) (stating that

"[i]n a tort action, whether the trier of fact is a jury or the court, if the trier of fact
determines that any defendant is liable for punitive or exemplary damages, the amount
of those damages shall be determined by the court").
101. MODEL PuNmvE DAMAGES ACT (Tentative Draft July 1996).

102.
103.
104.
105.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

§ 4(a).
§ 5(a)(2).
§ 6.
§ 7(a)(7).
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They decided not to have caps, because they thought caps were too
arbitrary."° If you have a small cap and Alarge problem, it is not going
to work. Everyone understands that. If you have a huge corporation that
has a risky product, and they get hit for only two times compensatory, it
is not going to make a change. They did consider other kinds of caps,
such as caps tied to the amount of the ill-gotten gain or the net worth of
the wrongdoer, but those were rejected. 7 Look at the Uniform Act
because I think it is a good way to go.
III. REBUTrTALS
THOMAS GOTTSCHALK: All right. There is not enough time to
respond to that point by point, so let me give you some general reactions.
First, I am in favor of the abolition of punitive damages, but I will
certainly accept substantial improvement along the way. Although people
say the studies are inconclusive, some studies like one in California
showing that juries had awarded $1.6 billion in punitive damages in a fiveyear period from 1990, provide evidence that the awards are on the
rise. " Certainly, demands for punitive damages are included in most
of the cases filed in the product liability area.
When I hear the plaintiffs' bar saying that it is not really such a big
problem because they have not been successful, I just treat that as simply
an expression of frustration. They still put punitive claims in fifty percent
or more of the cases.
Second, plaintiffs' lawyers say that punitive damages will only be
appropriate where the conduct is really flagrant, such as where data is
hidden. Let me give you one example, a situation at General Motors,
where we adopted some internal objectives to stretch ourselves and to
improve crashworthiness, by testing our cars at higher and higher crash
speeds.
We provided those crash test results in discovery. The argument was
then made that we should have told the buyers of our cars that we ran
these internal developmental tests and what the consequences were, so the
buyers could have had that information when they made their purchase.
This request is totally ridiculous in terms of the sort of information that
consumers could reasonably digest at the time of sale. But this is the sort
106. See id. at prefatory note.
107. See Richard C. Reuben, This Model Sports No Caps, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996,
at 22.
108. Since 1990, California juries have returned 256 punitive damage awards
totaling $1.7 billion. See Punitive Damages Tort Reform, 1995: Hearings on S. 565
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. 97 (1995) (statement of
Theodore B. Olson).
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of argument you are hit with in terms of data being hidden from the
public.
With regard to product safety-the amount of regulation, particularly
on cars and in the medical field-we are overregulated, not
underregulated. There are dozens, if not hundreds, of regulations that
protect the public interest in consumer product safety.
With regard to competitiveness, there is no question that there are
higher costs associated with punitive damages, whether it is settlement
costs, transactional costs, or otherwise. In fact, the best argument for our
system of punitive damages is that if you like trade barriers, you should
be in favor of our product liability/punitive damage system because it
discourages foreign firms from coming into our markets.
And, last, on product safety and the supposed need for punitive
damages, I have never seen a client consciously consider the threat of
punitive damages when improving or developing a product. Any impetus
to make improvements was driven by the marketplace. On the other hand
I have seen clients consider whether certain products ought to be put on
the market at all, the tradeoffs and the risks of being sued if the product
is not one hundred percent favorable for everybody, and how those risks
could be best managed.
Within corporations, people are motivated primarily by their own
ethics, and they are, certainly, disciplined by the marketplace to want to
put a good, safe, and effective product in the hands of consumers. That
is how they compete.
That is what drives improvement in the
marketplace.
Punitive damages cause businessmen to look at our system as sick,
unfair, and exorbitant. It is counterproductive, certainly, from the
standpoint of confidence in the legal system.
DAVID WEINER: I have no doubt that General Motors spends a
great deal of time and energy trying to make sure the products that get put
on the market are as safe as they can be. I will concede that to General
Motors. However, I am a defense lawyer who has tried cases for
businesses both on the plaintiff and defense side, and I have never
understood the "crashworthy case."" ° But the fact of the matter is, we
have had a history in this country of companies not doing everything
possible to put safe products on the market. And, when those companies
have found products unsafe, they have not done the responsible, business109. See, e.g., Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir.
1995) (explaining that automobile manufacturers may be liable for design defects that
cause the driver or passenger to strike "the car's interior or objects exterior to the car,"
regardless of the cause of the initial collision).
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like thing and remove those products from the market or warn people
about the danger.
Some companies rush to the market with questionable products and
keep products on the market even when they know the products are
endangering lives. Those are the cases where truly egregious conduct
exists and where punitive damages are appropriate.
If General Motors can stand up in front of a jury-and they have some
of the best lawyers in the world-and show that what they have done is
proper, they are not going to lose punitive damage awards in ninety-nine
percent of their cases. Yes, they may get a runaway jury, but the judge
should take care of that. And, now, it appears that if the judge does not
do his or her job, and the appellate court does not do its job, the Supreme
Court will.
I admit some lawyers put in punitive damage award claims where they
have no justification for doing so. I have never handled a case where any
responsible corporate defendant said it would pay more because of a
frivolous punitive damage claim in the complaint. We know, in our
jurisdiction, punitive damages are not awarded in frivolous cases.
In fact, if you put in a punitive damage claim, we are going to make
you go to the test; paying more just encourages more people to file
frivolous punitive damages claims. I think most responsible business, GM
included, know what the statistics are, and know how few times they are
actually awarded, and even when they are awarded, how often they are
actually paid. The companies factor that into the settlement equation when
making their decision, not the fact that some runaway jury down in
Alabama gives crazy punitive damages in a case or two.
IV. AUDIENCE DISCUSSION
JUDGE SCIRICA: Thank you very much, Dave. I want to thank our
participants for their incisive and interesting views. Let us go to the
questions now.
QUESTION: Assuming that compensatory damages perform their
function of restoring the plaintiff to the status quo ante, and indeed
including whatever pain and suffering the plaintiff suffered, then the
function of punitive damages is deterrence. First, if deterrence is the
function and if the plaintiff has been fully remunerated, then why should
the punitive damages be paid to the plaintiff? Why should it not be paid,
for example, to the state to fund monies that might be then available to
plaintiffs who are injured by defendants that are judgment proof, that are
not apprehended, or where the recovery, for whatever reason, is too little
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or zero? Second, if we look at the Supreme Court's criteria,"' they
seem not to address the means by which proper deterrence remedies
should be formulated. For example, the criteria of comparable recovery,
recovery available in other types of actions, just seems to perpetuate the
problem that now exists. The criteria of a ratio begs the question of what
the proper ratio is. And, the criteria of the degree of reprehensibility, it
seems to me, is somewhat backwards in the sense that the more
reprehensible an act is, the less likely it is that a defendant is going to get
away with it without being sued, without compensatory damages
performing its useful function.
So again, the two questions are: Why should punitive damages be paid
to the plaintiff and what about deterrence?
JUDGE SCIRICA: There are several proposals to have punitive
damages paid into a state agency or the state treasury, or to have it
earmarked for a specific purpose."' In terms of policy, let us ask the
panelists for their views.
MR. WEINER: I do not think it makes sense because in order to get
a punitive damage award, you have to fight long and hard and do a lot of
work; therefore, the award should probably go to the punitive plaintiff's
lawyers, because they are the ones doing the work and not the state. I do,
however, think that it is a legitimate argument that half of it go to the state
or something similar. There are at least a couple states, and you can find
that in Justice Ginsburg's dissent, that are toying with that idea."'
MR. GOTTSCHALK: This is a segue into the luncheon presentation
by Judge 3Winter on the extent to which the defense bar is part of the
problem.1
110. The three guideposts to determine the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award are: the criminal or civil sanctions for comparable misconduct; the ratio of the
punitive damages award to the plaintiff's actual injury; and the degree of reprehensibility

of defendant's conduct. See BMW of N. Am., Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 15991603 (1996).
111. See RUSTAD, supra note 64, at 10 n.31.
112. See BMWofN. Am., Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1619 (referring to Arizona, Montana,
New Jersey, and New Mexico as states considering apportioning punitive damage awards
to state agencies).
113. See The Hon. Ralph Winter, Luncheon Address: Achieving Meaningful Civil
Justice Reform: Is the Defense Bar a Problem?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 605 (1997).
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Georgia in its tort reform actually provides for the state to take
114
something like seventy-five percent of the punitive damages awarded.
It was interesting to watch the dynamics of that fact in the Moseley
case." However I think as a matter of policy and philosophy, yes. We
are really talking about public interests, and the government is better
equipped to step in and protect the public interest. Using punitive
damages for public interest through government, frankly, makes a lot
more sense to me than leaving it in the hands of private individual
interests.
Really, if the plaintiff's lawyer does not get the money, there is less
incentive to bring the frivolous lawsuit, so there is some benefit to that.
But, again, I just raised the question of whether there is a need for it, as
you suggest, in light of all the other deterrents, civil and criminal, that are
available to our society.
JUDGE SCIRICA: As to the second part of the question, David?
MR. WEINER: Looking at the BMW case, if I were trying a case
involving punitive damages, the question of reprehensibility would lead me
to find out what the defendant has done to change its practice. BMW, I
think, did change their practices and is now telling people, no matter what
the cost of the repair, that there was repair to the paint.
QUESTION: I would like to make the following proposal and see
whether you think that you could support it in theory and whether or not
you think it would have any impact in practice. It has always seemed to
me that punitive damages are really a "wolf in sheep's clothing"; they are
a criminal punishment clothed in the trappings of a civil trial. How would
you feel about leaving punitive damages in place, no caps, no limit, but
raising the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as it is in most
criminal trials?
MR. WEINER: I think that is an interesting approach. I have not
seen that before. I have always had a hard time with the jury's
understanding of the difference between "clear and convincing evidence"
and "beyond a reasonable doubt." But, I think it is worth looking at.
MR. GOTTSCHALK: One of the elements of tort reform has been to
raise the standard for punitive damages. If we are going to keep them,
114. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp. 1996) (requiring that 75% of
punitive damage awards, less proportionate litigation costs, be paid to the state treasury).
115. State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (upholding the constitutionality
of § 51-12-5.1 of the Georgia code).
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that is an appropriate thing to do. But, we have to address other elements
of the problem. And, again, after you have really worked with one of
these cases in one of these venues, and recognized what a morality play
it is, it is clear that there is not a big difference between reckless disregard
of human health and safety and proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a
person was acting with disregard for consumer interests.
The ability to play on anti-corporate attitudes, particularly, is so very
strong in some of these jurisdictions. In those jurisdictions, at least, it
raises a question of whether such claims ought to be decided by a sixperson jury, and whether it is under a criminal standard or a civil
standard. I think there should be more attention and tight control by the
judiciary, like an English judge does, or there should be action by the
legislature.
QUESTION: My question is directed to Mr. Weiner. As a plaintiff's
attorney, does the presence of a punitive damages claim have an impact
on your settlement demand?
MR. WEINER: I think a legitimate plaintiff and a legitimate plaintiff's
lawyer with a legitimate punitive damage claim get more in settlement.
If it is a trumped up one, then there is no likelihood that punitive damages
would be awarded. I do not think you get anything for a claim that has
no merit once you look at the facts.
MR. GOTTSCHALK: There is what we call a venue tax, to be quite
honest, and there are certain areas of the country where settlements go up
as a result. But, the problem is that to do the sort of defense that David
suggested earlier-hiring the best defense counsel, and doing a lot of
testing-takes a lot of effort and is very expensive. When you look at the
nuisance value of the cases, there are very few $25,000 nuisance value
cases any more. Simply to compile a privilege log in one case recently
cost us $150,000. That is just one small part of a case. So you are
talking literally millions of dollars to do an adequate defense in some of
these cases.
QUESTION: Let me start off by mentioning that if we were serious
about duplicating, in principle, some of the protections for defendants in
the actual criminal realm, we would have to do a whole lot more than
raise the burden of proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence.
Criminal defendants are entitled by the Constitution not to be forumshopped against; there is a very particular venue. Of course, they are
entitled to some sort of determinant sentencing. Though we wish to deter
murder, we do not structure it as one to N years, but we actually provide
a maximum sentence.
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The question that I wanted to ask had to do with Mr. Weiner's
interesting and, I thought, quite effective recapitulation of the law review
literature in defense of punitive damages. Professors Rustad and Koenig
are the centerpiece, and I have always been fascinated by their argument
that punitive damages in product cases are rational because they are mostly
awarded under one of five theories: you rushed the product to market too
quickly, you did not warn adequately, you were not forthcoming enough
with information once a controversy arose, and a few others." 6
Those fascinated me because they include most of the theories on
which lawyers sue on corporate conduct in product cases, and, given the
large amount of data produced in discovery, there are few cases in which
lawyers cannot raise some question about one of those issues. But the
other thing that fascinated me was that it ties in so neatly with what I
always call my "sauce for the gander proposal," namely to eliminate the
exceptional industry that is not currently called upon to pay for any
damages, even though it constantly goes around injuring people by rushing
its products to market too quickly, by not disclosing their weak points
when it rushes them to market, and by not fully disclosing the weak points
even after controversy develops about them. Not to keep you in suspense,
I am talking about the litigation industry.
The litigation industry's level of exposure for damages stemming from
its harms to innocent people pegged along at the very comfortable level
of zero compensatory plus zero punitives for many years. Then, Rule 11
came along in 1983 and bumped the damages up to the totally intolerable
level of compensatory damages in cases where attorneys had been
really
7
malfeasant, and zero damages for the great majority of cases.,
This was considered an intolerably high amount of liability, so the last
round of reform basically provided, if I understand the analogy correctly,
a "Gilda Radner Memorial 'Never Mind' Provision." If the opponent
points out that the pleading has no basis in fact, you have a safe harbor in
which to withdraw it."' This is very similar, I think, to a corporation
being allowed to get away from all compensatory damage by recalling its
product-a complete insulation.
Now, the question-and I really am leading up to a question-is that
assuming for purposes of consistency we would want the litigation
industry to have the same level of damage exposure, which I assume in
this case is unlimited punitive damages for all cases where defendant
116. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (providing for a court to sanction an attorney who

irresponsibly or unethically signs and presents a pleading, such as complaint or written
motion, to the court).
118. See Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1993
Amendments, N.Y. L.J., May 10, 1993, at 1.
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might ask for it after prevailing, then are the procedural methods going to
be the same. In particular, will the litigation industry submit to extensive
discovery of what it knew, and when it knew it, by waiving lawyer/client
privilege, and, in general, will they submit to all of the procedural
burdens that the substantive defendant now does?
Chrysler tried that when it sued the lawyers who were bringing the
class action devices. 9 I believe that suit was dismissed on the
pleadings. It is too much of a topic, as your question suggests, to get into
here, but I think it is a valid point that the perception in the public is that
the legal profession, the judiciary included, is too much of a guild. There
is too much reliance on self-regulation, which means no regulation.
Therefore, only when the lawyers start feasting upon one another in
malpractice claims might there be a greater sensitivity to the need for
reform in the system.
QUESTION: Two short questions: Do you know of any jurisdiction
where punitive damages have been awarded in a bench trial? Second,
what would be the effect if, whenever punitive damages were pled, you
had to impanel a twelve-member jury instead of a six-member jury?
MR. WEINER: I do not know the answer to the first question.
MR. GOTTSCHALK: They have been awarded in bench trials,
arbitrations too, incidentally.
MR. WEINER: That is true, even in securities cases in arbitrations.
As for the second question, I believe in the twelve-person jury. I think
six-person juries are the wrong way to go in all cases.
MR. GOTTSCHALK: I would rather have a court-appointed expert
come in and advise the court as to whether this was really the sort of
conduct that rose to the level of flagrancy and reckless disregard,
particularly when any technical issue or medical product is involved.
There should be some threshold determination by the court before the case
goes to any jury, whether six or twelve-person.
MR. WEINER: How do you like that, Judge?

119. See Polly Lane, Berman Beats Chrysler, SEATTLE TIMES, May 15, 1996, at
D1; Richard B. Schmitt, Chrysler Bites Back at Class-Action Lawyers, WVALL ST. J.,
Mar. 27, 1996, at B1.
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JUDGE SCIRICA: You know, the twelve-person jury issue is now
before the Judicial Conference. They are going to be considering it next
week.
QUESTION: About twelve months ago in England, they established
the national lottery, and the top prize was twenty-five million pounds.
Since then, the entire nation appears to have become a nation of gamblers.
In that context, do you consider that the ability to claim punitive damages
in America effectively has a major contribution to play on the psychology
of the nation in the sense that people think they have the ability to
suddenly become millionaires by bringing a lawsuit?
MR. WEINER: Yes, and I think the media is at fault. For example,
in the McDonald's coffee spill case, the media never covered the judge's
Those were just not
remittitur or the reduced final settlement.
newsworthy events.
MR. GOTTSCHALK: My answer to your question is, yes.

